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Abstract A new set of alternative socioeconomic scenarios for climate change
researches—the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)—includes for the first time
a more comprehensive set of demographic conditions on population, urbanization,
and education as the central scenario elements, along with other aspects of society,
in order to facilitate better analyses of challenges to climate change mitigation and
adaptation. However, it also raises a new question about the internal consistency of
assumptions on different demographic and economic trends under each SSP. This
paper examines whether the interactions between the demographic and economic
factors implied by the assumptions in the SSP projections are consistent with the
research literature, and whether they are consistently represented in the projection
results. Our analysis shows that the interactions implied by the demographic
assumptions in the SSPs are generally consistent with findings from the literature,
and the majority of the assumed relationships are also evident in the projected
trends. It also reveals some inconsistency issues, resulting mainly from the use of
inconsistent definitions of regions and limitations in our understanding of future
changes in the patterns of interactions at different stages of socioeconomic devel-
opment. Finally, we offer recommendations on how to improve demographic
assumptions in the extended SSPs, and how to use the projections of SSP central
elements in climate change research.
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Introduction
A new set of alternative socioeconomic scenarios for climate change research—the
shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)—includes for the first time a comprehen-
sive set of demographic factors on population, urbanization, and education, along
with other aspects of socioeconomic conditions, such as gross domestic product
(GDP), technology, and governance. It presents a major step forward as compared to
the earlier IPCC socioeconomic scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) that only
include projections of total population size, considered mainly as a scaling factor for
assessing challenges to climate change mitigation. In the process of developing the
SSPs, the climate change research communities have identified the most important
and quantifiable demographic (population, education, urbanization) and economic
(GDP) factors as central scenario elements critical for meeting both mitigation and
adaption challenges (Schweizer and O’Neill 2013) and have projected changes in
these four factors for the twenty-first century under each SSP.
The SSPs start from qualitative narratives, describing five different development
pathways (Fig. 1 Panel A), under which the world faces different levels of
challenges to adaptation (along the horizontal axis) and to mitigation (along the
vertical axis). Sustainable development is the main organizing principle in SSP1, in
which technology advances toward an environmental-friendly process, inequality is
lessened, and a small but highly educated and urbanized population is well
positioned both to mitigate and to adapt. This is in sharp contrast to SSP3, a
fragmented world with large challenges to both mitigation and adaptation due to
rapid population growth, slow economic growth, less investment in human capital,
slow urbanization, and high inequality. The SPP2 reflects an intermediate case
between SSP1 and SSP3. SPP4 represents a world where adaptation challenges
dominate due to high inequality across and within countries, where relatively rapid
technological advance leads to relatively large mitigative capacity, while economies
are isolated for the benefit of elites, leaving the less educated majority of population
in poorly managed municipalities with limited adaptive capacity and so highly
vulnerable to climate change. The SPP5 represents a world where mitigation
challenges dominate because of a focus on conventional economic growth, lacking
incentives for developing alternative energy technologies to meet high energy
demand, but at the same time, having slower population growth, high investment in
human capital, strong institutions for managing resources and development, and so
therefore less vulnerable and better able to adapt to climate impacts.
Building on the qualitative narratives several research teams have taken steps to
quantitatively project the trends of these central elements under each of the SSPs
using various modeling tools: population and education projections by IIASA (KC
and Lutz 2012); urbanization projections by NCAR (Jiang and O’Neill 2012); and
GDP projections by OECD (Dellink and Chateau 2012), IIASA (Cuaresma 2012),
and PIK (Kriegler and Leimbach 2012). All the projections are based on
assumptions made for countries of high-, medium-, and low-income groups by
each modeling team (Dellink and Chateau 2012), based on discussions in the
working group ‘‘IAM quantitative drivers and IAM scenarios for SSPs,’’ formed by
the climate change research communities.
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Panel B of Fig. 1 summarizes these assumptions on changes1 in the four central
elements for countries by income under each SSPs. Along the diagonal of the chart,
the growth rates in urbanization, per capita GDP and education, are assumed high
(medium high for GDP) under SSP1, medium under SSP2, and low under SSP3 for
all countries. The assumptions on population are the same for medium- and low-
income countries—low under SSP1, medium under SSP2, and high under SSP3, but
different for high-income countries—medium under SSP1 and SSP2, low under
SSP3. These assumptions are made with the intention that the challenges to both
mitigation and adaption increase from SSP1 to SSP2, and to SSP3. On the off-
diagonal matrix spaces, however, the assumptions under SSP4 and SSP5 show some
combinations, which differ from those in the conventional architecture of
socioeconomic scenarios, such as in the previous IPCC assessment reports. Under
SSP4, low GDP and education growth but high urbanization growth are assumed for
medium- and low-income countries, while medium growth in all the three elements
is assumed for high-income countries; population growth is assumed high for low-
income countries but low for high- and medium-income countries. Assumptions
under SSP5 are similar to those under SSP1, except high population growth is
assumed for the high-income group, and higher GDP growth is assumed for all
countries.
On the one hand, this new set of alternative socioeconomic scenarios, and the
quantitative projections of the central elements will facilitate better assessments of
challenges to climate change mitigation by the integrated assessment modeling
(IAM) communities and will meet the needs of the impacts, vulnerability, and
adaptation (IAV) communities for analyzing climate change impacts. On the other
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Fig. 1 Qualitative narratives (a, on the left) and the assumptions (b, on the right) on central elements for
countries by income under SSPs. Note the central elements are POP population, URB urbanization, GDP,
EDU education, the income groups are HIC high income, MIC medium income, LIC low income;
assumptions on future changes are H high scenario, M.H medium high scenario, M medium scenario,
L low scenario
1 In this analysis, unless otherwise specified, the test of the assumptions and their implied relationships
are all based on the changes (annual growth rates), not the levels, of the demographic and economic
elements.
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in the projections about changes in the demographic and economic trends between
different SSPs and across regions within one SSP, especially given that the
projections are generally conducted by different modeling teams and by using
different modeling tools.
Scholars often consider two types of internal consistency tests in validating
model results: (1) the internal consistency of individual projections, and (2) the
internal consistency within and between groups of projections. The first type of
consistency test has already been conducted by each modeling team, proving their
assumptions and results to be consistent with either observed data, empirical
analysis, or existing theories (Cuaresma 2012; Dellink and Chateau 2012; Jiang and
O’Neill 2012; KC and Lutz 2012; Kriegler and Leimbach 2012).
In this paper, we focus on the second type of internal consistency test; this is
especially important given that each modeling team makes its assumptions
regarding the element (or elements) it focuses on without explicitly accounting
for the effects of other elements. For instance, the impacts between population/
education and urbanization are not explicitly modeled in either the population/
education or urbanization projections; while the economic projections use
population and education as input, the direct impact of urbanization is not
considered.
Even though the assumptions in the projections of individual elements are made
separately (except the population and education projections, which are made in an
integrated model by IIASA), the combination of assumptions on individual elements
under each SSP implies certain types of interactions between these elements. We
can assign for each two elements a positive relationship when they both are
concomitant under high, medium or low assumptions or a negative relationship
when one of the two elements is under high and the other under low assumptions.
When one of the two elements is under medium assumption and the other under
either high or low assumption, their relationship can be either positive or negative.
The six sets of implied interactions between each two of the four elements for
countries of three income groups under five SSPs are summarized in Table 1. It
suggests the implied relationships under SSP2 are all positive because all elements
are assumed medium changes. Similarly, the implied interactions between education
and GDP (Edu*GDP) are positive for all income groups under each SSP. The
positive interactions between urbanization and GDP (Urb*GDP) and between
urbanization and education (Urb*Edu) are also implied in all cases, except for
medium- and low-income groups under SSP4. The implied relationships between
population and each of the other three elements are more varied: for low- and
medium-income groups, they are all negative under SSP1, SSP3, and SSP5, but
mixed under SSP4; for high-income groups, they are all positive under SSP3 and
SSP5, but positive or negative under SSP1 and SSP4.
Are these implied interactions in the SSP projections theoretically reasonable and
empirically evident? Are they consistently reflected in the projection results? These
are the two main questions this paper addresses. In the next section, we review the
research literature on relationships between the demographic and economic factors
based on empirical studies or economic modeling, and examine whether the implied
interactions in the SSP projections are consistent with findings from the literature.
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We then analyze the SSP projection results, study how the projected changes in the
four factors are correlated, and compare them to the implied relationships. Based on
these analyses, we make recommendations in the final section on how to use the
projection results of the SSP central elements, and discuss how to improve future
works for developing the extended SSPs for the climate change researches at the
regional and local levels.
Comparing implied interactions and interactions suggested by existing
research
We review the literature on the interactions between changes in population,
urbanization, education, and economic growth based on empirical evidence or
economic and demographic modeling. The review is conducted for the relationships
between each pair of the four factors, considering the bidirectional causal effects.
The findings on the interactions suggested by the literature are then compared with
Table 1 Implied interaction between assumed changes in urbanization, GDP, population, and education
for countries by income under SSPs
Urb*GDP Urb*Pop Urb*Edu Pop*GDP Pop*Edu Edu*GDP
SSP1
High income ? ?/- ? ?/- ?/- ?
Medium income ? - ? - - ?
Low income ? - ? - - ?
SSP2
High income ? ? ? ? ? ?
Medium income ? ? ? ? ? ?
Low income ? ? ? ? ? ?
SSP3
High income ? ? ? ? ? ?
Medium income ? - ? - - ?
Low income ? - ? - - ?
SSP4
High income ? ?/- ? ?/- ?/- ?
Medium income - - - ? ? ?
Low income - ? - - - ?
SSP5
High income ? ? ? ? ? ?
Medium income ? - ? - - ?
low Income ? - ? - - ?
‘‘Urb*GDP’’ refers to the relationship between urbanization and per capita GDP, and so on
‘‘?’’ indicates a positive correlation, ‘‘-’’indicates a negative correlation, ‘‘?/-’’ indicates the rela-
tionship can be either positive or negative
GDP gross domestic product, SSP shared socioeconomic pathway
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those implied by the assumptions in the SSP projections in order to test the internal
consistency of those assumptions.
Urbanization and population
Urbanization affects population
The majority of studies of the impacts of urbanization on population growth point to
negative effects. Studies in industrialized countries find that urban areas in the early
stage of urbanization play the role of a ‘‘population sink’’ (Dyson 2003), because
higher population density is associated with higher death rates before the onset of
epidemiological and demographic transitions. Infectious diseases thrived in towns,
where people lived at relatively high densities and interacted at high rates, resulting
in a crude death rate higher than the birth rate, under which the urban sector in the
long run would not exist without rural-to-urban migration (de Vries 1990).
Moreover, degrading urban environments posed health hazards to both wealthy and
low-income settlements in most countries, leading to the proliferation of disease
vectors (Goldstein 1990). In more recent decades, HIV infections are generally
higher in urban areas than those in the rural, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Caldwell et al. 1997; Douglas et al. 2001).
The negative effect of urbanization on population growth is found to be more
salient in modern societies because of lower fertility. Studies in many European
countries and the USA indicate substantially lower fertility rates in urban areas than
that of rural since the early nineteenth century (Jaffe 1942; Merrick 2001; Rutstein
2002; Singh and Casterline 1985; UN 1987). Selective migration to urban areas also
leads to lower national fertility in countries such as India (Mohan 1984), China
(Guo et al. 2012; Zeng and Vaupel 1989), and the Philippines (Hiday 1978).
Moreover, rural out-migration may accelerate fertility transition through changing
preferences for reproduction and leads to smaller family size. While the rural-to-
urban migrants of first generation may not substantially change their reproductive
behavior (Hawley 1971) and present higher cumulative fertility than native urban
residents (White et al. 2005), other studies found urbanization reduced fertility even
within the first generation in Puerto Rico and Bangkok (Goldstein 1973), Bombay
(Visaria 1969), and Ghana (White et al. 2005).
Urbanization can also positively affect population growth in recent decades due
to its strong impacts on improving health (Jayasuriya and Wodon 2002). Better and
more efficient health facilities and services in urban areas helps reduce mortality
and morbidity, increase life expectancy, and contributes to population growth.
However, this positive contribution of urbanization on population growth through
reducing mortality is significantly smaller than its negative effect due to fertility
reduction.
Population affects urbanization
Studies on the impacts of population growth on urbanization mainly suggest a
positive effect. Goldstein (1990) indicates that population growth increases the
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density of rural settlements that are consequently reclassified as urban. The high
urban growth rate in many less developed countries since the 1950s is mainly
caused by rapid population growth (Mohan 1984) and has resulted in 16–48 %
increases in urbanization in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and
South East Asia during 1950–2010, significantly faster than the historical trend
experienced by the industrialized regions (Dyson 2003).
While high urbanization growth rates are largely driven by high population
growth, a slowing down of national population growth does not necessarily cause a
reduction in the urbanization growth rate (Mohan 1984). When the annual national
population growth rate decreased from 3.0 to 1.5 % in the 1970s in some Latin
American countries, the urbanization growth rates only declined from 6–7 % to
4–5 %. Moreover, zero population growth accompanied by technological progress
and income rise can increase the urbanization growth rate. Under certain conditions,
a reduction in population growth may speed up the rate of urbanization (Mohan
1984). The experience of Japan and several other modern economies shows that
increasing agricultural productivity and growing wealth reduces income elasticity of
demand for food and causes a shift of consumption patterns toward urban goods,
which in turn results in increasing demand for urban labor and high rates of
urbanization even when the population growth rate decreases.
Urbanization and education
Urbanization affects education
Gary Becker (1964, 1993) and his followers argue that urbanization leads to
specialization and technological innovation due to higher competition, and therefore
increases returns on investment in education. Urbanization is a strong determinant
of the efficiency of countries in improving education outcomes (Glaeser 1997),
because in the urban areas it is typically cheaper to provide access to education
services and easier to monitor performance and attract quality inputs (Hardoy et al.
2001; Jayasuriya and Wodon 2002). Empirical studies in the USA indicate that
urbanization in 1930–1960 increased the average size of schools, reduced the
number of school districts with small enrollment, and contributed to improving
education efficiency (Havighurts 1967). However, the positive impact of urbani-
zation on human capital accumulation only occurs above a certain threshold level of
development (Bertinelli and Zou 2008). Because of the limitation in human capital
and rudimentary technology, the education systems in many poor countries are not
able to benefit from increase in population density (Becker 1993). Bertinelli and
Zou (2008) find that an urbanization level below 40 % deters human accumulation
and suggest an (inverted) U-shaped relation between urbanization and education.
Others suggest a negative effect of urbanization on education. Stamp (1968)
argues that urbanization is a significant cause of education problems for both rural
and urban schools in Canada, because it reduces school attendance and teacher’s
salary in the rural ones, and makes it hard meeting the education needs of the rapid
growing industrial cities. Rapid urbanization in Africa has also been associated with
a large number of young school leavers who join the large flow of out-migration
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(Byerlee 1974) and degrades the education system. The study by Jayasuriya and
Wodon (2002) also shows that a very high level of urbanization (above 60 %) may
lead to decrease in efficiency for net primary enrollment. Therefore, urbanization is
a double-edge sword (Bertinelli and Zou 2008): Too little urbanization limits
accumulation of human capital, while too much or too rapid urbanization growth
rate also causes difficulties in meeting education demands.
Education affects urbanization
Studies on the effects of education growth on urbanization are scarce. Preston
(1979) indicates that rural out-migration probabilities are higher among those with
higher education attainment, reflecting greater returns to urban residence for the
educated than for the non-educated. The selectivity of migration for more
productive workers further contributes to city growth and urban economic
advantage (Greenwood 1981, 1997). Therefore, education is usually associated
with more urbanization. On the other hand, improving education in rural areas may
dampen the flow of individuals who move to the urban for acquiring more
education.
Urbanization and economic growth
Urbanization affects economic growth
Many economists argue that urbanization leads to economic success because of
clustering in cities, economies of scales, knowledge spillover, efficient supply of
external inputs, common pool of high skill workers, higher specialization of labor,
and technological advancement (Henderson 2003; Krugman 1991; Lucas 1988). A
body of historical scholarship strongly suggests that urbanization, spatial inequality,
industrialization, and economic development are positively related (Bairoch 1993;
Ciccone and Hall 1996; Hohenberg 2004; Hohenberg and Lees 1985; Hussain et al.
2009). Glaeser (2011) finds that the correlation coefficient between the logarithm of
per capita GDP and urbanization is 0.7, that a 10 % increase in urbanization is
associated with a 61 % increase in per capita GDP; he maintains that to a certain
degree city growth reflects a global transition from poverty to prosperity.
The positive impact of urbanization on productivity is largely due to increasing
capital mobility, which leads to lower transaction costs. However, excessive
concentration in the urbanization process can also increase congestion that limits
capital mobility and increases transaction costs (Baldwin and Martin 2004).
Therefore, in the urbanization process, gains of agglomeration work against the
costs of static congestion diseconomies; and the relative importance of the two
effects changes across stages of urbanization and development (Bertinelli and Black
2004). The potential gains from agglomeration matter most at early stages of
development, when transportation and communication infrastructure is scarce, the
reach of capital markets is limited, and efficiency can be significantly enhanced by
concentrating production in space, while the congestion diseconomies do not change
with the level of development per se. When infrastructure improves and markets
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expand, the relative importance of congestion will increase with the level of
urbanization and development (Bertinelli and Black 2004; Williamson 1965).
Henderson (2003) suggests that there is an optimal level of urbanization or urban
concentration in terms of maximizing productivity, which varies with the level of
development and country size. More importantly, productivity growth is not
strongly affected by urbanization per se; it is the form of urbanization or the degree
of urban concentration that strongly affects productivity growth.
Given the variations of urbanization impacts in different stages and forms of
urbanization, statistical analyses using cross-country data from various time periods
with different coverage of regions and countries reveal some negative effects of
urbanization on economic growth. Ades and Glaeser (1995) find that both
urbanization and urban primacy have a significantly negative effect on economic
growth. Brulhart and Sbergami (2009) reveal that while urbanization generally leads
to high productivity, the effect is reversed when a country achieve US$ 10,000 per
capita GDP; Gallup et al. (1999) indicate that while urbanization is conducive to
economic growth in coastal regions, increasing urban density in the interior has the
opposite effect. Bloom et al. (2008) find no evidence that urbanization levels affect
economic growth rates. They argue that although there is strong evidence that
workers in urban areas are individually more productive and earn more due to
economies of scale and richer market structure, rapid urbanization is associated with
crowding, environmental degradation, and other impediments to productivity.
Economic growth affects urbanization
Urbanization is often regarded as primarily an economic process (Berry 1973;
Mohan 1984). Williamson (1988) points out that the rapid urban expansion since
1800 is the result of economic growth due to industrialization. According to Davis
(1955), the origins of urban centers are due to improved agricultural productivity.
Advances in agriculture increase the productivity of farmers and create food surplus,
resulting in the influx of rural migrants to the urban areas (Todaro and Smith 2003).
Lacking technical change or productivity growth in agriculture is the reason for
slow urbanization in many less developed countries (Mohan 1984). The changing
employment opportunities due to national economic growth and changes in
industrial structure are basically the underlying explanation of urbanization (Jones
2003). The economic history of many industrial and post-industrial nations has seen
a dramatic rise in urbanization as the national economies developed (Hughes and
Cain 2003).
However, in recent decades, urbanization sometimes occurs in places where there
is little or no economic growth. In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa urbanized rapidly
despite protracted negative economic growth (Fay and Opal 1999). Urbanization
independent from economic growth was also observed in Latin America in the
1920s–1930s (Davis and Casis 1946; Hoselitz 1957). In other regions, some
countries have even experienced urbanization during periods of economic
stagnation or decline (Oucho and Gould 1993). In most of those cases, the farmers
fled impoverishment and starvation in rural areas and migrated to the city with little
hope of improving their standard of living (Todaro and Smith 2003). A cross-section
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and time-series analysis of 35 developing nations indicates a negative relationship
between urbanization and urban primacy and economic growth (Abdel-Rahman
et al. 2006). For the nations tested, those years in which urban population was
growing faster were the years in that their economies were growing the least.
Population and Education
Population affects education
Studies aimed at quantifying the mechanisms underlying the correlations between
population growth and human capital formation are limited (Rosenzweig 1988).
However, there exists empirical support for either a positive or negative
contribution from population growth to education achievement. Weiner (1991)
finds that declining population growth triggers educational expansion, not only
because a small student population makes government services less costly, but also
because declining birth rates are associated with greater parental willingness to send
their children to school due to their changed view of children from being considered
assets to being considered liabilities. Therefore, once a country starts its
demographic transition, the greater parental demand for education and lower
marginal costs of education will lead to expansion of mass education. On the other
hand, Beaudry and Green (2002) argue that high population growth promotes
adoption of high technology and makes up for relative scarcity of physical capital,
which leads to high incentive to invest in education. Statistical analysis of historical
records suggests that one-third of the increase in literacy is explained by population
density (Boucekkine et al. 2009).
Education affects population
Empirical studies reveal that educational attainment makes a positive contribution
to population growth through reducing mortality, but a negative contribution
through reducing fertility. KC and Lentzer (2010) indicate that in virtually all
societies, better educated individuals have lower mortality rates, and their children
have better chances of survival. Similar findings can be found in early studies of the
USA (Antonovsky 1967; Crimmins and Saito 2001; Elo and Preston 1996;
Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Pappas et al. 1993; Rogot et al. 1992), Europe
(Deboosere and Gadeyne 2009; Ezendam et al. 2008; Fawcett et al. 2005; Feldman
et al. 1989; Huisman et al. 2005; Kunst et al. 2004; Mackenbach et al. 2003;
Mackenbach et al. 1999; Valkonen 1989), Korea (Khang et al. 2004; Son et al.
2002), Japan (Sakata et al. 2012), China (Liang et al. 2000; Zhu and Xie 2007),
Bangladesh (Hurt et al. 2004; Mostafa and Ginneken 2000), and Vietnam (Huong
et al. 2006).
While the positive contribution of education to population growth through
reducing mortality is more obvious before and during the early stage of
demographic transition, improving educational attainment induces much stronger
negative effects on population growth due to fertility reduction in the later stages.
Educational differentials in fertility are among the best established and most widely
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studied (Caldwell 1982; Cleland and Rodriguez 1988; Cochrane 1979; Jeffery and
Basu 1996; National Research Council 1999; UN 1987). Women with higher levels
of education universally have fewer children, because they marry later and less
often, have greater autonomy in reproductive decision-making, have more
knowledge and better access to contraception, use contraception more effectively,
and are more motivated to limit childbearing because of its higher opportunity costs
(Bongaarts 2010; Jejeebhoy 1995). The effect of education on fertility is particularly
strong in countries that still have relatively high overall fertility levels (Skirbekk
2008). Therefore, in countries in early stage of demographic transition, small
increases in female literacy rate can generate a substantial decrease in birth rates and
spark demographic change. Demographic modeling exercises indicate that the
global population outlook depends greatly on further progress in education,
particularly of young women (Lutz and KC 2011).
Population and economic growth
Population affects economic growth
The impact of population growth on economic growth is very controversial among
scholars. On the one hand, Malthusians and Neo-Malthusians maintain that
population growth causes physical capital dilution and leads to lower productivity
and slow economic growth. In areas where natural resources are managed as
common property, greater population will lead to pressures on and ultimately
degradation of the natural resource base. Increased scarcity of natural resources
leads to greater demand for children (Nerlove 1991), as the marginal value of
children’s time relative to adults’ time rises. If the substitution effect outweighs
income effect, the worsening environmental conditions will increase demand for
children in spite of the fact that an additional child worsens resource scarcity for all
other families. This leads to a vicious cycle: greater population leads to worsening
environment and economic condition, and worsening environment and economic
condition leads to more rapid population growth (Dasgupta 1995).
On the other hand, many authors argue that population growth promotes
economic growth through a positive impact on the state of knowledge and progress
in technology (Kuznets 1973; Simon 1981, 1986). The Malthusian trap could be
overcome by sufficient investment in human capital, making up for relative scarcity
of physical capital (Becker et al. 1990). The history of the world has shown that
periods of low population growth have been periods of low economic growth and
that high rates of economic growth have occurred when population growth is also
high (Johnson 1999), because while productivity is determined by land areas,
technology and human capital, technology (productivity) is endogenously deter-
mined by population growth (Kremer 1993). Population pressure triggers technol-
ogy improvement in agriculture, changes in location of population, and prevents
undesirable pressure on natural resources (Boserup 1981; Clark 1967). Industrial-
ization mostly occurs in regions of high population density (Malmberg and Lindh
2002). Population growth also causes increasing demand, which attracts investment
(Ogliett 2007); a large and dense population increases returns to investment in
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human capital and research, accelerates technological innovation, and ignites
economic growth (Voisenat 1987).
Other authors find that the positive contribution of population growth occurs only
in the long run (Hussain et al. 2009; Zanker 2004). There is no relationship between
population growth and economic development in the short run, because the positive
productivity effect and the negative capital dilution effect offset each other
(Mankiw et al. 1992). Moreover, the impact of population growth on the long-term
economic growth can be explained by research intensity and education attainment
(Jones 2002). Technological change only occurs in countries that have enough
human capital and advanced institutions (Kremer 1993). It is not population size or
growth that matters for technological change, but rather research intensity and
efforts (Mankiw et al. 1992). Moreover, the fruits of technological progress cannot
be captured exclusively by the country that produces them, but somehow get
diffused to the rest of the world (Jones 2002). A study of developing countries
during 1965–1985 indicates that developing countries were able to shift labor from
low productivity agriculture to high productivity industry and the service sector
despite rapid population growth; it is the timing and components of population
growth that are important elements in the process of economic development (Bloom
and Freeman 1988). At any given population growth rate, income growth is related
to the time path of population growth; population growth due to high birth and death
rates is associated with slower income growth than population growth due to
relatively low birth and death rates.
Economic growth affects population
Studies of demographic history indicate that socioeconomic transition has been
accompanied by demographic transition (Notestein 1945, 1953). Modernization and
industrialization changed the characteristics of high fertility and mortality, and the
decline in mortality preceded the decline in fertility and brought about a period of
rapid population growth (Coale 1973). While economic development has always
been negatively associated with mortality and contributes positively to population
growth, Clark (2005) finds there are different behaviors in the link between income
and fertility across different stages of development, which makes constructing a link
between population growth (which depends more on fertility) and income
challenging.
In the agrarian economies, most of the studies document a positive relationship
between income and fertility (Hagen 1959; Simon 1986; Skirbekk 2008), mainly
because high income and wealthy families can afford to have more children (Galor
and Moav 2002). This relationship becomes negative after industrialization (Jones
et al. 2008; Jones and Tertilt 2008), determined by factors including rising income
and growth of factory employment (Notestein 1953). Becker (1960) argues rich
people have fewer children because they are more expensive for parents with higher
wages in terms of opportunity costs. Rising benefits from investment in human
capital lead to reallocation of expenditure from numbers to quality (Galor and Moav
2002). Increasing female earnings also significantly contributes to fertility decline.
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A study of 83 countries in 1995 finds a 10 % increase in female labor force
participation is associated with 0.45 fewer children per women (Feyrer et al. 2008).
However, Clark (2005) indicates that in modern high-income but low-fertility
societies, there seems to be no association between income and fertility. The
negative relationship between economic growth and fertility is mainly a statistical
fluke. Once the missing variables are controlled for, fertility and income are actually
positively related. For instance, the income level of men is indeed weakly positively
correlated with fertility once correctly controlling for female income (Jones et al.
2008). Even the negative relationship between female labor force participation and
fertility has changed over time, shifting from negative in the 1970s to zero in the
1980s–1990s, and to an upward-slope by 2000 (Mira and Ahn 2002). It suggests a
U-shaped relationship, with the turning point at 50–60 % female labor force
participation. This variation is due to changes in the institutional context, such as
changes in childcare availability and attitudes toward working mothers that might
have reduced the incompatibility between childrearing and the employment of
women (Engelhardt et al. 2004). Ranjan (1999) explains the sharp decline in birth
rates in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern European countries and suggests
that it may be optimal for individuals to postpone childbearing during times of
increased income uncertainty. Therefore, economic growth and income stability
may contribute to higher fertility in very low-fertility countries.
Education and economic growth
Education affects economic growth
Most existing studies suggests that the impact of investment in education on
national economic growth is positive (Hannum and Buchmann 2003a; Hanushek
and Wossmann 2007; Temple 2001; Wilson and Briscoe 2004). At the individual
level, people’s earning can be seen as a function of education and other factors such
as age and experience. Mincer (1974) finds that an extra year of education raises the
earnings by about 7 % for US white males. At national level, education is needed
for countries to make good use of available technology. Stevens and Weale (2003)
reveals that a 1 % increase in primary school enrollment rate raises GDP by 0.35 %,
and the rates of return from investment in education are found in the range of
6–12 %.
However, studies also suggest that marginal economic returns decrease with the
amount of education received by individuals and with the income level of the
country concerned. One extra year of education raises labor income by about 10 %
in a developing country, but by only 6.5 % in an advanced economy (Psacharo-
poulos 1994). Hence, there may be a possibility of over-education in countries with
very high education levels. Moreover, the positive impact of educational attainment
on economic growth needs a long time to ripen (Lutz et al. 2008; Temple 2001).
Stevens and Weale (2003) find that higher levels of GDP growth are associated with
higher levels of primary enrollment some 30 year earlier. As a result, macroeco-
nomic analysis shows that changes in educational attainment are largely unrelated to
the current economic growth rate (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). Prichett (2001) even
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finds primary enrollment negatively related to income growth, because in many
poor countries the provision of basic education is a great burden on society.
Voisenat (1987) indicates that low levels of school attendance seem to be a burden
on the economy rather than a booster of productivity, and only when the threshold
of about 4 years of schooling is reached does the effect of education on productivity
become positive.
Lutz et al. (2008) indicate that the ambiguity in the empirical evidence relating
education to economic growth is largely due to the deficiencies in the series of
education data. Using the new educational attainment data by age groups, their
study shows significantly positive education impacts on economic growth for some
age and education groups. Other authors, on the other hand, argue that it is difficult
to find a clear causal relation between education and economic growth, because it is
cognitive skills rather than mere school attainment that is powerfully related to
individual earnings, the distribution of income, and to national economic growth
(Hanushek and Wossmann 2007); education enhances but does not ensure an
individual’s economic security, since it does not necessarily narrow social
inequality or enhance democratization (Hannum and Buchmann 2003b).
Economic growth affects education
Many authors argue that growing income is the most important driver of mass
education (UNDP 2003; World Bank 2003). Lack of income is generally perceived
as the most significant barrier to educational expansion. In low-income countries,
households derive a significant portion of their income from child labor and are
therefore less motivated to send children to school (Fuller and Rubinson 1992;
Weiner 1991). Moreover, the poorer the country, the more difficult to increase
public expenditure on education and improve education quality (Clemens 2004),
and the more reluctant are the parents to send children to school because of the
perceived low economic returns to education (Probe Team 1999). A higher
aggregate income level allows states to invest more in education and improving
education quality, which significantly contributes to education expansion. As family
income increases, the ability and willingness of citizens to temporarily forgo income
to continue their education also increases. This explains why higher national income
level leads to increased societal demand for education (UNDP 2003; World Bank
2003).
However, Easterlin (1981) indicates that the spread of formal education in
Northwestern Europe, North America, and some developing countries seems to have
preceded the beginning of modern economic growth. Studies of the cross-section
and cross-time statistical analyses do not find any positive effects of income on
average schooling years of the population (Easterly 1999). An event-history
analysis, based on newly available enrollment data for over 120 countries for the
period 1870–1980, reveals that expansion of mass education is endemic in the
system, organized politically as nation-states or candidate states. It appeared at a
steady rate before the 1940s but sharply increased after 1950 (Meyer et al. 1992).
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Summary
To summarize the findings from the literature review, Fig. 2 plots the direct and
indirect causal relationships between each of the four factors, accounting for the
direction of the effects (positive or negative), degree of consensus among the
literature (high, medium or low agreement), and the evidence from the amount of
studies (robust, medium, or limited evidence). Moreover, based on the causal
relations established by the literature, we are able to derive the signs of dominant
effects between each pair of the four factors for regions at different development
levels and for the whole world (Table 2).
Comparing the signs of correlations between these factors suggested by the
literature (in Table 2) with those implied by assumptions in the SSPs projections (in
Table 1), we find that they match reasonably well with each other. More
specifically, the correlations between changes in education and per capita GDP
(Edu*GDP) are all positive for regions at various development levels in both
Tables 1 and 2; the relationships between urbanization and GDP (Urb*GDP) and
education (Urb*Edu) are also dominantly positive and shows a consistent pattern in
both tables. More importantly, the signs of relationships implied by the assumptions
under each SSP projection can all find confirmation in the literature, except for the
Fig. 2 Interactions of changes in population, urbanization, education, and economy in the literature.
Notes 1. ‘‘?’’ denotes dominantly positive; ‘‘-’’ dominantly negative; ‘‘±’’ unclear or change in various
stages of development and urbanization. 2. Solid line high agreement; dashed line medium agreement;
dotted line low agreement; 3. Thick line robust evidence; normal medium evidence; thin line limited
evidence
Table 2 Sign of correlations between changes in population, urbanization, education, and economic
growth based on findings from the literature
Urb*GDP Urb*Pop Urb*Edu Pop*GDP Pop*Edu Edu*GDP
World ? ?/- ? ?/- ?/- ?
More developed ? ?/- ? ?/- ?/- ?
Medium developed ?/- ? ? ?/- ?/- ?
Low developed ?/- - ?/- - - ?
Same as Table 1
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relationships Pop*GDP, Pop*Urb, and Pop*Edu for low-income countries under
SSP2. This exception may not be a serious inconsistency problem, because the same
medium assumptions for different factors follow in fact different paths in different
development stages. We return to this point in the next section.
Examining the interactions in the projection results
The previous section showed that the interactions implied by the assumptions in the
SSP projections are reasonably consistent with findings in the existing research
literature. This section examines whether these same implied relationships are
consistently represented in the projection results produced by the different modeling
teams. Data on the SSP projection results are obtained from the SSP database. For
GDP projections, we use the projection of the OECD modeling group since it is
considered the ‘‘marker’’ of GDP projections for the SSPs. We derive the aggregate
statistics for regions by income and for the world based on the national level
projections and weighing the projected population of countries in each region.
Figure 3 shows the relative changes (1950 = 1) in global population, urbaniza-
tion, education (mean year of schooling of population aged 15?), and per capita
GDP under each SSP. At the global level, the projection results on the four factors
generally match the changes expected from the qualitative narratives and
quantitative assumptions under each SSP. Along the diagonal of the chart, low
population growth but high urbanization, education and GDP growth are observed
under SSP1; high population growth but low urbanization, education, and GDP
growth occur under SSP3; and medium growth in all the four factors are found
under SSP2. On the off-diagonal matrix spaces, SSP4 has medium (close to SSP2)
population growth, fast urbanization, very low education, and low (close to SSP3)
GDP growth, while SSP5 has low (close to SSP1) population growth, fast
urbanization and high education growth, and very high per capita GDP growth. We
calculate the bivariate correlation coefficients between projected changes in each
pair from the four factors at the global and regional level, and summarize the results
in Table 3.
It shows that while the majority (82.5 %) of the signs of correlations between the
factors in the projection results (Table 3) are the same as for the implied
relationships by the assumptions (Table 1), some correlation coefficients (marked in
bold/italic) show different signs. The differences mainly occur to the relationships
between population and other factors (Pop*GDP, Pop*Edu, Urb*Pop), particularly
for low- and medium-income regions under SSP1, SSP3, and SSP5. One possible
reason for the differences is due to the fact that the definition of income regions used
in the population and education projections is slightly different from that used in the
GDP and urbanization projections. While the latter is based solely on income levels,
the former considers the differences in fertility. Even though fertility levels are often
highly correlated with income levels, countries of the same income group may fall
into different fertility groups. The difference in region definition may be partly
responsible for the inconsistency in the relationships between population and GDP
growth and the relationships between population and urbanization. However, it
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cannot explain the inconsistency in the relationships between population and
education, given that the population and education projections use the same region
definition and both are produced by the IIASA model.
Another inconsistency occurs in the relationships between urbanization and GDP
growth for medium- and low-income regions under SSP4. The assumed negative
correlation between urbanization and GDP for those countries under SSP4 aims to
represent the situations of ‘‘rapid urbanization without growth’’ (Fay and Opal 1999;
Oucho and Gould 1993), which occurred in some Sub-Saharan African and Latin
American countries in the past. It does not appear as expected in the projection
results. This may be due to the fact that these countries may be increasingly and
highly urbanized in the future, and the interactions between urbanization and GDP
vary in different stages of urbanization and economic development. This is
particularly true for the medium-income countries. The other small inconsistency
Fig. 3 Historical and projected relative changes in global population (red), urbanization (purple),
education (green), and economic growth (blue) under SSPs (1950 = 1). Notes the historical data for the
period of 1950–2010 (shaded areas) on population is from World Population Prospects 2010 Revision
(United Nations 2011), urbanization is from World Urbanization Prospects 2009 Revision (United
Nations 2010), education (mean year of schooling of population aged 15?) is from IIASA (Lutz et al.
2007), and per capita GDP (PPP 2005$) is from Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2011). The data for the
future (2010–2100) is derived from SSPs database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/
dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=welcome). Because global per capita GDP declined during the 1950s and
the early 1960s, the scale of relative changes in per capita GDP (the right vertical axis of each chart) starts
from 0.5 (Color figure online)
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occurs in the relationships between education and GDP growth under SSP1 and SSP5,
which may also be due to the same reason: As human societies under SSP1 and SSP5
enter an era with advanced education and economic development levels, the interactions
between education and economic growth may shift into different paradigms. This is
particularly true for high-income countries. Further analysis of these interactions by
stages of urbanization and economic development could help better understand the
evolving patterns of changes in these factors and their interactions.
Moreover, the positive correlations of Pop*Urb, Pop*GDP, and Pop*Edu implied
by the assumptions for low-income countries under SSP2, which differ from the
findings in the literature, are actually consistently reflected in the projection results.
It is noteworthy that the literature revealing negative relationships between these
factors is based on the data from some less developed countries during certain
periods in the past. And, the countries included in the SSPs low-income regions
already display some variations in development levels at the present time, and we
may anticipate larger differences in the speed and timing of demographic and
economic transitions in future decades. The negative correlations suggested by the
literature for Pop*Urb, Pop*GDP, and Pop*Edu may occur for some low-income
Table 3 Bivariate correlation coefficients of the projected changes in population, urbanization, educa-
tion, and per capita GDP for regions by income and for the world under SSPs
SSP Region Urb*GDP Urb*Pop Urb*Edu Pop*GDP Pop*Edu Edu*GDP
SSP1 World 0.544 0.588 0.601 0.451 0.558 0.299
High income 0.164 - 0.416 – 0.570 –
Medium income 0.616 0.387 0.543 0.414 0.659 0.413
Low income 0.306 0.662 0.573 0.339 0.540 –
SSP2 World 0.552 0.577 0.604 0.477 0.653 0.448
High income 0.260 – 0.345 – 0.559 0.143
Medium income 0.595 0.270 0.457 0.309 0.615 0.384
Low income 0.210 0.568 0.499 0.216 0.536 0.136
SSP3 World 0.422 0.486 0.134 0.398 – –
High income 0.190 0.351 0.316 0.210 0.368 0.236
Medium income 0.443 0.121 0.224 0.132 0.229 0.170
Low income – 0.294 0.125 – – 0.160
SSP4 World 0.480 0.537 -0.157 0.283 -0.136 –
High income 0.223 – 0.255 – 0.282 0.105
Medium income 0.637 0.271 – 0.147 – –
Low income 0.178 0.445 -0.205 – -0.177 0.119
SSP5 World 0.526 0.497 0.601 0.302 0.494 0.275
High income – 20.156 0.416 20.255 0.369 -0.173
Medium income 0.589 0.338 0.542 0.334 0.634 0.362
Low income 0.297 0.650 0.572 0.318 0.532 –
‘‘-’’ non-significant; the values in bold and italic are those different from the implied relationships by the
assumptions; others same as Table 1
GDP gross domestic product, SSP shared socioeconomic pathway
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countries during some periods of time, but we may expect they will not occur for the
whole income group or for the whole projection period.
Conclusions
Our research shows that the inclusion of a comprehensive set of demographic and
economic factors in the SSPs is well designed, and the resulting scenarios convey
coherent stories about future development pathways. The implied interactions by
the combination of group assumptions on population, urbanization, education and
economic growth under SSPs are generally consistent with findings from the
literature, and appropriately reflected in the projection results produced by
individual modeling teams.
This analysis also reveals some issues of inconsistency existing in a few implied
interactions by the demographic assumptions in the SSPs for some income country
regions, which differ either from those suggested by the literature or from those
appearing in the projection results. Some inconsistency problems can be attributed
to the differences in definition of the SSP regions used in different SSPs projections.
Those problems can be avoided relatively easily in the future works. However, to
avoid some other inconsistency issues, we need to improve our understanding about
the evolving relationships between these demographic and economic factors in
human history and their possible changes in the future. For instance, we need to
explore the patterns of these evolving interactions in different stages of economic
development and urbanization through analyzing the historical statistics and
comparing with the results in the SSPs projections. That research is beyond the
scope of this paper and will be reported in another article.
Moreover, the analysis in this paper is based only on the first set of global basic
SSPs. The climate change research communities are currently developing extended
SSPs for research at the national and local levels. The assumptions in the extended
SSPs based on national and local circumstances can also produce more consistent
results and contribute to better understandings of the variations in the interactions
between the demographic and economic determinants in different stages of
socioeconomic development and demographic transitions. In fact, some relation-
ships implied by the combinations of assumptions that have inconsistency issues at
the global or region levels could prove to be reasonable in the analysis at local
levels.
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